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COMPUTER CENTER NOTES
TOWARD COMPUTER NETWORKING-THE HARVARD
EXPERIENCE
By JOE B. WVATT*
Economic pressure is a powerful motivational force for change. At least one of
Harvard's numerous innovations-namely, the divestiture of a major part of its
in-house computing service resources-has been stimulated by fiscal deficit. This
particular innovation hasworked well for Harvardduring itsearlyimplementation
for several reasons, not the least of which is the stemming ofa fiscal hemmorage
which accumulated a S1.6 million deficit in five years. It is clearthat the changes in
philosophy and procedure resulting from the solution to this fiscal problem have
implications more far ranging than just economics. This assertion is based on
three hypotheses which have been supported to some extent by Harvard's
experience and for whidl supportive evidence continues to accumulate.
1. It is not damaging to the basic functions of an educational institution to
perform a major part of its computing service using remotely located
resources.
2. The point has been passed (if it ever existed) in the development of infor-
mation technology when a single computer system can best satisfy all of
the information processing needs ofan educational institution.
3. The potential viability ofdigital communications networks, coupled with
theinfluenceofsemiconductortechnologyand relatedstoragetechnologies,
will substantially alter the economicand behavioral models ofinfurmation
processing.
This paper examines one issue which cuts across the assessment of these
hypotheses-the economic incentive of a multi-resource network which could
exist for a community of computer users. The sample is small and microscopic.
The results, however, are very suggestive ifincomplete.
THE SETTING fOR CHANGE
In 1971,after accumulatinga deficit ofSl.6 millionin seven years, the Harvard
Computing Center divested its in-house computer hardware. The XDS Sigma 7
and the IBM 360 model 65 configurations, both rented, were returned to their
manufacturers and the staff of the Harvard Computing Center was reduced by
40 percent. Replacement services were arranged from remote computing services
separately for time-sharing and batch usage. The functions ofthe Harvard Com-
putingCenterwere affectedsubstantially.Theuserinterface function, for consulting
with computer users relative to applications and problem solving, remained
essentially the same. However, since remote computer services replaced the
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541on-campus hardware, the operationsstaffand the systems programmingstallwere
virtually eliminated. Remote computing services were uscd as replacements
includin~:
I. Ajoint C,)l1lputing service center for hatch l:omputing was established with
MIT using MIT opuations staffand an IBM .nOIlS5 iocated at MIT.
2. A contraU was consllmmated with First Data Corporation for the lise of
a DEC System 10 for time-sharing services.
With some modifications. these agreements have remained in place sincc the Fall
of 1971 1 Since November of 1971. the average usagc has been 12,211 jons per
month (stcllldard deviation of 1,778) at an average total wst ofS0H,53 I per month
(standard deviation of$12,614).
Usage ofthe joint center by Harvard began in October 1971. By 1l1ne. the cnd
ofthe academic year, the joint opcration faced an ,)perational dilemma. MIT had
installed the IBM Time-Sharing Option (TSO) to the operating system of the
370/155 and was actively encouraging its use. Harvard was relatively satisfied with
the First Data arrangement. MIT had utilized approximately 65 percent of the
capacity ofthejoint center's 370/155 alld was pressing for ,lIll!pgrade t,) a 370/165
configuration. Harvard experienced no similar need for processor capacity. The
objectives and the philosophy ofthe two institutions relative to computing services
were sufficiently different that the arrangement wHld not continue to function as
a partnership.
As the solution to this problem. it was agreed that MIT would implement its
plan to upgrade to a 370/165 configuration and would continue to operate the
Center. Harvard became a major customer of MIT, buying approximately 25
percent of the capeteity of the system for a guaranteed minimum price. The IBM
370/165 processor was installed at MIT in September of 1972.
Few Harvard computer users will argue that the incremental effect on the user
of replacing the on-campus resources of the XDS Sigma 7 and thc IBM 360/165
with access to remote facilities was noi noticeable. The program conversion effort
from the Sigma 7 to the DEC System 10 was agoni7ingly complex. Conversion of
programs from the IBM 360/65 to the IBM 370/155 was not without difficulty. It
is still argued by some that worthy programs were not converted because of the
short-term lack offunds. Others argue that the conversion effort had a purifying
effect by climinating programs of lesser significam:e. In the cursory post facto
examination which was made. one fact loomed distinguishabic. Except for the
relatively small number of time-sharing applications which resulted in significant
conversion effort, most ofthe major conversion problems related to the IBM 7090
to IBM 360 move in the late 1960's, a non-trivial phenomenon but unrelated to the
divestiture. Nevertheless, the effect of all of these changes in the compllter user
community had its effect on user aititudes.
The change from the IBM 7000 series ofwmputer systems to the completely
incompatibie IBM 360 seri\:s produced a national trauma2 Users were urged to
spend substantial sums in program conversion in order to achieve the cos\.
performance "savin~s" ofTered hy the IBM 360. Most sucwmbed. Many w~re
adverselyaffected by t~le costs in time anddollars for conversion, not to mention the
major fiasco created by IBM because of the delivery schedule delay and specifi-
cation defaults ofthe IBM 360 Operating System (OS/360)]
542At Harvard. lhange and conversion (fwm tlte IBM 7090 to the IBM 360;50
and the XDS 940 io the IBM 360'05 and the XDS Sigma 7) had been justified hy
the management of the Computing Center on ihe basis of clonomic factors: an
elonolllY o!" sl:ak producing grcaler cost ctleetivcness to tIll: IIser. The under-
ntilized capacity and the corresponding price increases to compensate withont
reduction of expense produced the deficit which triggered the user demands for
relief. This demand resulted in the organizational changes. the philosophica!
changes. and the removal of the major on-campus computing resources. Asmvcy
ofc:ompnter usage at Harvardcompleled in April of1')73has revealed that approxi-
mately 30 difkrent computer systems arc currently being nsed by the Harvard
commnnity.'l Approximately half of these systems are not at Harvard. Ten
different manufacturers' systems are represented. Twenty-two of the systems arc
not program compatible at the "machine language" level. Some of the usage is
very limited, some is extensive. The "Iocus shifts." howcver, arc generally directed
by improvement in prileand performance. not by administrativefiat orby academic
disciplin(; groupings.
Harvard now represents diversity in wmpnter usuge. There is .1 balance of
on-site and ofr-site computing resource nsage with mnltiple compnter systems
involved. Measured in terms of equivalent dollar value. Harvard continnes to use
off-campns eompnting facilities to satisfy a majority ofits computing needs. Eaeh
ofthese systems is ntilized on the basis ofan evaluation which included economic
comparison of alternatives
1'11I' MICRO-MARKEl
One of the more Important factors apparent from the Harvard experience is
that with all funds for computer service placed in the hands of the IIsers, there
appears to exist a viable market. It is tme that university computer users generally
have a fixed budget for computing services. However. when tme computing
resource alternatives become available. some shopping takes place. A simple
market is created. On the basis of the limited evidence available at Harvard. the
market is sensitive to price and service time (response or turnaround) within a
menu of"equivalent" services.
Since the beginning of the joint Harvard-MIT CelHer. each institution had
established its own price structure, creating a "Harvard rate" and an"MIT rate,"
each based on a component usage profile: and each deSigned to recover total cost to
the institution. The MIT rate fa vored relatively processor intensive usage; the
Harvard rate favored relatively input-output intensive usage. The alTeet of the
difference between the Harvard prilcs and the MIT prices on Harvard users was
suosequently analyzed over a period of several months (Table 1). It W.lS thus
determined that approximately 10 percent of the jobs processed at the Harvard
prices could benefit by reduced cost using the MIT priles. The afTect on revenue
was estimated to be less than 5 percent. As a result. beginning in March of 1973.
Harvard users were allowed to choose between two alternative price structures
on an individual job basis. Approximately 1,350 jobs per month representing a
total a"erage cost ofS12.000 per month have been processed using the .. MIT-like"
alternate price structure.
543TARLE I
CmlPARATlVI' EffF.Cr Of HARVARD PRI(H A:-ID MIT PRins
Al:tual billings at Harvard prices:
Lower values ofjobs were:
Cost at Harvard prices < cost at MIT pric'.:s
Cost at Harvard prices> cost at MIT prices
Totals
Variance from actual billings: S ..
n
----_.-_. --------







The Harvard chemists discovered during 1972 that certain of their processor
intensive computations could be performedsubstantially less expensively using the
Columbia University360 model 91 than by using the IBM 370 model 165 at MIT,
at an acceptable sacrifice in turnaround time. Some usage ofthe 360/91 was begun
and continues on this basis.
Amoregeneral examination ofthe Columbia alternative was begun in May of
1973. A population ofjobs were compared between MIT's 370/165 and the 360/91
at Columbia. The comparison, involving 13,758jobs, was conducted by taking the
accounting summary data from all the jobs actually executed on MIT's 370jl65
at Harvardpric.es for March of1973 andprocessingthesedataagainst theColumbia
price structure. Service priorities calling for differences ill rate structure were
sufficiently similar that it was possible to make a one-to-one mapping ofthe five
priority categories at Harvard-MIT onto the five priority categories at Columbia.
For purposes oi the experiment, no extraordinary costs were included; only the
basic prices of each institution were used (excluding any communications costs,
etc., which would be required tocommunicatewith Harvard users). In theaggregate,
the total March workload cost $109,302 at the Harvard-MIT prices and $119,529
at the Columbia prices.
However, Figure I shows a different perspective of the job cost comparison.
In Figure I, the number ofjobs for which the Harvard-MITcost was at least S10,
a total of2,538, and for which the total cost for job processing at Columbia rates
was less is plotted against the percentage dollar savings for job processing. The
number ofjobs which satisfy the criteria in Figure 1 is 951,37 percent ofthe total
population. Slightly over 400 ofthesejobs would have been processed at a saving
in excess of20 percent using the Columbia rates.
The conclusion reached from this first experiment was that the savings in cost
for some individual jobsjustified further investigation of the cost and method of
providing alternate remote servic~s.
Encouraged by the potential alternative at Columbia, a similar analysis for
IBM 360 model 91 at Princeton was performed utilizing the same 13,758 jobs from
the March, 1973, usage of MIT's 370 model 165. Since Princeton offers a rate
structure not geared to priority service categories, all service categories of usage
from the MIT computer system were compared to Princeton's "standard" service
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Figure I "Ten Dollar" Jobs With Savings At Columbia Prices
in the case of the Columbia system, cost comparisons used basic Princeton prices
excluding communications and related costs which would be experienced by
Harvard users. On this basis, the total March workload which cost S109,302 at
the Harvard-MIT prices, cost S51,092 at the Princeton prices!
A comparison ofjob costs by Harvard service classes between the Harvard-
MIT, Columbia, and Princeton price structures is shown in Table 2. The results
TABLE 2
HARVAR[)-COI.U~lBIA-PRINcETON Cmll'ARISON BY HARVARD PRIORITY CI.ASS
Priority No. Jobs Harvard('l Columbia ($) Princeton ($).
Restricted 10 559 59S 1.I21
Deferred 3.282 25.528 20.728 13.132
Low 631 5.742 5.959 2.809
Student 8.146 54.696 62J)()2 23.931
High 435 5.314 5.558 :,243
Advanced 1.253 17.447 24.670 8.853
Emergency 1 16 12 3
Total 13.758 109.302 119.529 51.092
----
• All at Princeton's "standard" priority and price.
ofthis comparison indicate that for most priority service categories, the Princeton
job costs would be substantially less than Harvard-MIT, ranging from 49 percent
to 81 percent by category. Again, a different perspective can be found in thosejobs
which cost at least $10 for processing at Harvard-MIT prices and for which costs
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Figure 2 "1"('11 Dollar" Johs With Savings At Princeton Rates
were less at Princeton prices. A summary ofthis comparison is shown in Figure 2.
In this Cilse, the total number ofjobs which satisfied the criteria were 2,529 ofthe
total 2,538 ~ Equally startling in this comparison is the fact that 2.521 of these jobs
wouldexpenencesavings in excessof20 percent in lOSt. and 2,280 wouldexperience
savings in excess of 40 percent in cost. The results of the Princeton comparison
indicate a considerably larger margin for ultim~te savings to the user on the bilsis
oftheassumption used, which included the biasofapplying Princcton's "standard"
rate to all jobs regardless of priority (and price) category for Harvilrd-MIT.
To provide a more microscopic summary to the economic comparisons of
the use ofthese three computer systems and to test some of the assumptions used
in the comparisons, a selected set of benchmark problems were processed on all
three computer systems. These benchmark problems were selected to represent
various types of usage from the Harvard community, and each was chosen from
546the sct of951 jobs which were proetsscd at less cost 1t Columbia pritcs than at
Ilarvard-MIT prices. Table-:; coutainsacomparisollofthtactualcost for protcssing
each of thtSC Jobs as computed from the individual price structurts of tht tlH.:e
::ystems. It is quitc clear from this limikd comparison that substantial savings
could accruc 10 users from one type ofjob to another by ··shopping" betwc:en thc
threc computing resources. These factors would serve to support the hypothesis
that establishing a comnuu:;':ations nttwork betwctn Harvard. MIT. Columbia.
and Princeton. could conceivably create a rewarding market in computer serviCl.:s.
TABLE .1
















































Sore. All johs were processed using Princ~ton ··'landard··
pri.;cs. th~ Columbia ··standby prioril/· pri<:cs. and the Harvard·
1'.1 IT ··deferred pnority"· prices.
TIlE OBSTACLES TO GENI:RALIZATION
In the opeuing paragraph ofthe paper. it was asserted that Harvard's plan for
substantive use of remote eomputiug services might be gelll.:ralizable. The
ARPANET has already proVCII that such itsystem is at least in part technologically
viable. The issues raised. howcvi.:f. arc much greater iu scope than a technological
diseussioll. The issues also include qutstions of organization. economic implica-
tious, and political/regulatory decisions.
The role of legal and regulatory developments cannot be underestimated
when considering an alternative ··seenario" for computing without a local com-
putingcenter. The federal CommunicationsCommission has opmed the inter-city
digital communications market to eompctition, allowing companies other than
AT&T to provide such services. The telephone compauy has responded with a new
service olTered called .·Digital Dat" Services·· (DDS). based ou an economy in
multiplexing called ··Data Under Voice'· (DUV). approved by the FCC for
operation iu 1974. The rate structure for DDS will substantially decrease some
digital communications costs.
5 Packet Commullications. Inc. has been awarded
the first liccuse for the commercial operation of 11 computer communications
network to operate uationally using the packet switching eonerpt from the
ARPANET. Numerous other companies. including Datran and Microwave
Communications. Inc.. arc already in the digital communications business. Some
547ofthemajormarketresearchstudies ofthecommercial remote computingindustry
have resulted in startlingly optimistic projections. These developments would
indicate the availability of a variety of digital communications facilities for
establishingmulti-resourcecomputingandcomputer-basedinformationnetworks.
Inorder to obtain a feel for the communications problem for such a network,
severallimited experiments havebeenperformedatHarvard.First,a small number
ofjobs from the Harvard workload were transmitted to the IBM 360 model 91
computer system at the University of California at Los Angeles using the
ARPANET. Batch job input and output were successfully performed using the
DEC System 10 in the Center for Research in Computing Technology at Harvard
which is connected to the ARPANET. However, it was demonstrated that inter-
facing to the ARPA networkfor such operation is a non-trivial endeavor requiring
several man weeks in programming. Moreover, the experiment demonstrated that
the translation required from packet nomenclature to the nomenclature of the
OS/360 spooling queue on input and the reverse on output required sufficient
processing by the host computer at UCLA to measurablyincrease the cost ofeach
job.Considering the current cost ofanARPA IMPofapproximately $100,000 and
adding the cost for telephonelinecommunications, the viability oftheARPANET
for general usage, although technologically sound, is not obvious economically at
"(ull" cost. It appears from the cost projections for a more contemporary packet
switched network that the communications costs would not be prohibitive based
on the proposed rate structure ofPCI.6
Second, an analysis was performed assuming the use ofconventional "leased
line circuits" from AT&T. Itwas determined from this analysis that, for this set of
experiments, a conventional telephone line represented an economically viable
solutionoperatingat4,800 baud. Typicalcostsfor this communicationsalternative
are shown in Table 4. Parenthetically, by the use ofa software package available
for the IBM 370 model 145, the spooling to the Columbia computer system
could be handled simultaneously both with the spooling to MIT and with the
operation of stand-alone DOS programs with no change in the configuration of
hardware.. ..
TABLE 4
















Ofcourse, the basic "raw" computing cost including the communication cost
does not nearly represent the total cost to the remote user. As a matter offact, in
the two years of the Harvard-MIT arrangement, the sum of these two costs
represents approximately half of the total costs. The remainder of the cost of
remote usage is represented by the operation and management of user terminal
facilities and services. Ifthis arrangement is typical, as it is felt to be, any resource
network must provide that the "buyer" institution would receive a discount from
548the "seller" institution sufficient to cover all of the costs of communications,
operation, management, and user consultation. The Harvard-MIT agreement for
computer services for 1973-74 is at least a comparative model for such a discount
arrangement. MIT sells Harvard a guaranteed minimum amount per year of the
"raw" services of the IBM 370/165. Harvard pays all other costs including those
for all communications, RJE terminals, interactive terminals, supplies, all user
consultation and support, accounting and billing. and installation management
for remote usage. MIT grants Harvard a discount of approximately 60 percent
computed from MIT's "over-the-counter" local rates. A similar arrangement is
being finalized between Harvard and Princeton.
Major benefits accrue to each institution in such an arrangement. The seller
receives substantial additional income at little or no increase in expenseand at no
additional risk. The buyer receives a cost-effective service. The computer users of
both institutions benefit from the economy of scale of a large computer system
which is justified on the basis ofthe cc.mbined workloads.
These data, of course. represent only an illustrative analysis from one per-
spective. The data do show rather conclusively that a potentially viable market
exists, assuming that computer users hold fully fungible dollars for obtaining
computer services, as is the case at Harvard: and that the costs of remoie usage,
includingcommunicationscosts,can be morethanoffset by thesavings represented
from the availability ofmultiple resources.
CONCLUSIONS
There has been substantial testimony here and elsewhere to the fact that the
basic ingredients exist to implement a more general computer network resource.8
It will become necessary, however, that a general technological methodology be
developed which would allow users to effectively utilize multiple computer
resources. This situation is not yet the case. For example, it is now a non-trivial
task to modify the operating system control statements necessary to move a job
between similarly configured IBM 370 systems, although each ofthe systems may
be similar in configuration andmay operate under OSj360. Itis also an unpleasant
chore for a user to recognize the differences in conventions and technical minutae
that exists between such resources. Extending this task to the more serious in-
compatibilities that exist between different manufacturers' computer systems
complicates the problem dramatically. Charles Holt7 has called for "articulated
programming" creating a set ofstandards for programming languages. However,
standardization in this area is not occurring quickly enough to alleviate this
problem in a reasonable time, ifever.
In order for a simple multi-resource to be user effective, a methodology to
address several significant technological questions must be developed. First,
techniques must be developed for "translation" of one operating system control
language to another. Translation techniques between differently configured and
architecturally different computer systems wiil be needed to move programs or
data prepared in one of the standard languages from one computer system to
another without a major effort. Second, techniques must be developed for com·
municating information from network computer resources to users about the
549variety and usage of the services of the resource. Many computing cenler~ (Ire
already weak in thc area of user consultation Or marketing thcir services. The
ullplcmentation of remotc access networks will focus attention on the nccessity
for adeqllilte documentation and comlllunication mechanisl11~ between computer
users and computer resources. Third, communication sy~tems are required which
will allow multiple types of user terminals to be transparently attached to the
network facilities. Fourth,a viable method for pricing and accounting for resource
and communications fdcilitics must be developed. If this is not imaginatively and
efficiently done, the problems created could make the network a dubious oppor-
tunity for both buyers aud sellers.
These technological issues, not unlike the other issues, range from the simple
to the complex. Within the range, it is important to determine where reasonable
combinations of solutions exist through the usc of technology which will deal
adequately with these problems. If reliable and generalizable technical solutions
can be implemented and used at modest incremental costs, a major evolution in
the u~age of network computer resources in colleges and universities will be (
enabled. Resean.:h is needed to understand and develop the alternative techno-
iogicaJand economic methodologie~ presented here. Experiments will be required
involving multiple resources and multiple users to understand the operation and
use ofgeneral purpose networks. Ifsucha set ofmethodologies can be implemented
as hypothesized. a new set ofopportunities will be created. The opportunities will
raise more qualitative issues. including both the organizational structures and the
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